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THE CASE FOR LEGAL REGULATION
OF PHYSICIANS’ OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING
Philip M. Rosoff* & Doriane Lambelet Coleman†
INTRODUCTION
Prescription drugs and biologics1 can be used on- and off-label.
On-label signifies that the particular use to which the drug is being
put has been vetted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
through a series of trials or studies designed to establish the use’s
safety and efficacy.2 Off-label use signifies that the particular use to
which the drug is being put has not been formally approved by the
FDA3 and thus, unless it has been otherwise tested, its safety and effi 2011 Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman. Individuals and
nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any
format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the
authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision
and copyright notice.
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1982. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1988.
1 Drugs, or pharmaceuticals, generally include both small molecules generated
by chemical manufacturing processes as well as “natural” products such as some
antibiotics isolated from bacterial or fungal cultures. Biologics refer to therapies that
are purified natural products (generally of mammalian origin) such as some blood
components as well as those therapeutics produced by genetic engineering and biotechnology that mimic or are identical to naturally occurring proteins. See Edward L.
Korwek, What Are Biologics? A Comparative Legislative, Regulatory and Scientific Analysis,
62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257, 259–60 (2007) (providing background for statutory definitions of biologics).
2 See Off-Label Drug Use, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/docroot/
ETO/content/ETO_1_2x_Off-Label_Drug_Use.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). The
FDA does not establish a drug’s safety and efficacy for general purposes, but only for
the particular use or uses identified by its manufacturer for formal marketing purposes. See id.
3 See id.
649
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cacy for that use has not been established.4 Typical off-label uses
(OLU) include promoting, prescribing, and ingesting substances for
conditions other than those for which they were approved, in higheror lower-than-indicated dosages, and in populations other than those
in which they were tested.5
Pharmaceutical companies are largely prohibited from promoting their products’ OLU.6 However, OLU are otherwise legal. That
is, notwithstanding a lack of evidence of safety and efficacy, physicians
may lawfully prescribe and patients may lawfully take OLU.7 As a
4 See infra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing other testing possibilities).
5 See Off-Label Drug Use, supra note 2; see also William L. Christopher, Off-Label
Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (1993)
(suggesting that off-label uses might include using approved drugs for nonapproved
diseases or varying from the indicated dosage, regimen, or patient population);
Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional
and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 476–78 (2009) (describing physicians’ discretion in prescribing drugs at dosages or using methods of administration
not specified on the label).
6 See Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and “Off-Label” Uses of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 279 (1996). Recent regulations have been
proposed which may erode this strict policy. See Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved
New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, FDA (Jan. 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm (“FDA recognizes that the public health can be served when health care professionals receive
truthful and non-misleading scientific and medical information on unapproved uses
of approved or cleared medical products. Accordingly, if a manufacturer follows the
recommendations described in . . . this guidance, FDA does not intend to consider
the distribution of such medical and scientific information . . . as establishing [prohibited] intent that the product be used for an unapproved new use.”). Criticism of this
“new” proposal and its potential for abuse by drug manufacturers predates this regulation by forty-seven years. See Charles D. May, Selling Drugs by “Educating” Physicians, 36
J. MED. EDUC. 1, 22 (1961) (discouraging drug manufacturers’ “artful attempts to
enlist physicians in the sale of drugs by disguising promotion as ‘education’ ”); see also
Jim Edwards, FDA to Allow “Off-Label” Unapproved Drug Promotion, BNET (Jan. 13,
2009), http://industry.bnet.com/pharma/1000591/fda-to-allow-off-label-unapproved-drug-promotion (noting that this new approach is not about protecting
patients from unsupported OLU but “about trying to reduce the amount of responsibility companies have for their own drugs,” and that the result is that “you can expect
a new flood of drug company sponsored, peer-reviewed literature to hit the market on
off-label uses”); infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing companies’ financial
sponsorship of ghost-written articles destined for peer-reviewed publications).
7 See Off-Label Drug Use, supra note 2. Once a drug is approved by the FDA,
physicians are free to use it however they wish for the benefit of their (individual)
patients. This includes the situations for which the drug was tested and approved, as
well as others that the doctor, in her clinical judgment, believes would be appropriate.
See Christopher, supra note 5, at 248; David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of
Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. ON
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result, it is estimated that OLU account for up to twenty-one percent
of drugs and biologics used annually in the United States; this figure is
significantly higher in certain specialized settings such as oncology
and pediatrics.8
It is likely the case that most people are unaware of the distinction between on- and off-label uses.9 It is also likely that when physicians prescribe drugs for an off-label use, their patients are unaware of
this fact or (correspondingly) that they may not be safe or effective.10
Patients’ lack of awareness is due at least in part to standard medical
practice, which is not to disclose the OLU status of drugs to patients.11
LEGIS. 693, 698 (1978); Paul W. Radensky et al., Potential Liability for Drug Companies,
Health Care Providers, and Insurers: Off-Label Prescribing and Internet Advertising, in PHARMACEUTICAL LAW 239, 254 (Michael E. Clark ed., 2007).
8 See David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1025 (2006) (providing the figure of twenty-one percent); Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs:
An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 193 (1999)
(reporting on “[o]ne estimate suggest[ing] that between twenty and sixty percent of
all prescriptions are for off-label uses”). Some studies have estimated that the majority of prescriptions for anticancer drugs and drugs for children are for uses not
approved by the FDA. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Uses of Drugs Not Described in the
Package Insert (Off-Label Uses), 110 PEDIATRICS 181, 181 (2002); Radley et al., supra, at
1022–26; Michael Soares, “Off-Label” Indications for Oncology Drug Use and Compendia:
History and Current Status, 1 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 102, 104 (2005). Surrey M. Walton
reviewed national OLU and concluded that a significant percentage of such prescribing lacked any significant evidentiary support. See Surrey M. Walton et al., Prioritizing
Future Research on Off-Label Prescribing: Results of a Quantitative Evaluation, 28
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1443, 1443–51 (2008).
9 See Many People Think That Drugs Should Only Be Prescribed per FDA-Approved Use,
Not for Off-Label Use, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (June 9, 2004), http://www.harrisi.org/
news/allnewsbydate.asp?newsId=808 [hereinafter WSJ/Harris Poll] (reporting on the
results of a poll conducted for the Wall Street Journal and concluding that “ ‘[o]fflabel prescribing’ . . . is probably not an issue which many people have thought
about”); see also Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose OffLabel Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 968 (2007) (discussing
this poll); infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing this point); see also May,
supra note 6; Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label
Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557 (2009).
10 See Johns, supra note 9, at 968 (“A majority of patients believe that doctors
always prescribe drugs as approved by the FDA.”); id. at 1013 (“[T]he patient thinks
the drug has been proven safe and effective for the prescribed treatment following
rigorous scrutiny by the FDA, but with off-label uses it has not.”); WSJ/Harris Poll,
supra note 9 (“A 51% to 31% majority believes, wrongly, that a doctor can prescribe
drugs only for the diseases for which they have been approved . . . and that . . . [a]
48% to 31% plurality believes that doctors ‘should not be allowed’ to prescribe a drug
for diseases for which that drug has not been approved by the FDA . . . .”).
11 See James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 71–72, 76, 86–91
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Depending on the physician, this practice has at least two explanations: some physicians believe it is unnecessary for patients to know of
their drugs’ OLU status,12 while others are—like their patients—ignorant of that status and thus of the safety and efficacy of the drugs they
prescribe.13
Previous commentators have established up to four categories of
OLU depending upon the evidentiary basis supporting their safety
and efficacy: OLU justified by high-quality evidence, OLU justified by
some but not high-quality evidence, OLU justified by the need or
desire to innovate, and unjustified OLU.14 OLU are justified by highquality evidence of safety and efficacy using clinical investigation techniques not dissimilar to those employed by pharmaceutical companies
applying for FDA approval.15
(1998); W.A. Meadows & B.D. Hollowell, ‘Off-label’ Drug Use: An FDA Regulatory Term,
Not a Negative Implication of Its Medical Use, 20 INT’L J. IMPOTENCE RES. 135, 140 (2008).
12 See, e.g., Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 87–89; Meadows & Hollowell, supra
note 11, at 139–40.
13 See Donna T. Chen et al., U.S. Physician Knowledge of the FDA-Approved Indications
and Evidence Base for Commonly Prescribed Drugs: Results of a National Survey, 18
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 1094, 1094–99 (2009). As one commentator
notes, “[d]octors generally don’t tell people that they’re prescribing drugs pitched to
them by pharmaceutical salespeople for unapproved treatments . . . . [In fact,] [m]ost
physicians don’t keep track of FDA-approved uses of drugs . . . . ‘The great majority of
doctors have no idea; they don’t even understand the distinction between on- and offlabeling.’ ” David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for Unapproved Uses,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=A4yV1nYxCGoA (quoting Peter Lurie).
14 Although not always using this particular phraseology, several previous commentators have established the equivalent of these categories, which track the push
toward evidence-based medicine more generally. See, e.g., Amy P. Abernethy et al.,
Systematic Review: Reliability of Compendia Methods for Off-Label Oncology Indications, 150
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336, 336–43 (2009); Nicole Ansani et al., Designing a Strategy to
Promote Safe, Innovative Off-Label Use of Medications, 21 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 255, 255–61
(2006); Nicole Ansani et al., United States Medical Practice Summary: Innovative Off-Label
Medication Use, 21 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 246, 246–54 (2006); Madlen Gazarian et al.,
Off-Label Use of Medicines: Consensus Recommendations for Evaluating Appropriateness, 185
MED. J. AUSTL. 544, 546 (2006); see also Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the
Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 381
(2002) (noting that “[b]y constructing a rough hierarchy that reflects the value of the
different types of clinically-relevant information, evidence-based medicine attempts to
improve decisionmaking by practicing physicians” and explaining that “[w]hen faced
with a clinical problem, health care professionals should, in descending order of preference, look for guidance in systematic reviews of randomized controlled trials, the
results of individual controlled clinical trials, observational (uncontrolled) studies,
and anecdotal reports of clinical observations”).
15 For instance, this could include the design and performance of high-quality,
statistically valid clinical trials. There are also methods of slower, incremental accrual
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OLU whose safety and efficacy have not been established by such
clinical investigation techniques (problematic OLU) can cause significant harms: They can cause physical harm (including death) to
patients both directly, if they turn out to be unsafe,16 and indirectly,
when they are ineffective and used in lieu of an existing, established
alternative.17 Patients also suffer harm when their physicians prescribe problematic OLU without disclosing in advance the relevant
facts about the drug’s off-label status and the dearth of evidence concerning safety and efficacy. Two related patient rights are violated in
this setting.
First, patients have the right to decide for themselves (as part of
the informed consent process) whether or not they will accept particular medical treatment; long gone are the days when the law and medical ethics permitted physicians to make treatment decisions for their
patients without ensuring in advance that they knowingly and voluntarily understood and accepted the associated risks and benefits.18
Modern physicians have a corresponding legal and ethical duty to disclose all of the facts that are material to their patients’ treatment decisions.19 Although the argument to the contrary has been strangely
of validated evidence for and against an OLU, often compiled by such databases as
the Cochrane Collaborative. See M.C. Brouwers et al., Evidence-Based Health Care and
the Cochrane Collaboration, 5 CLINICAL PERFORMANCE QUALITY HEALTH CARE, 195,
195–201 (1997).
16 See A.M. Gordon & B.K. Logan, Topiramate-Positive Death-Investigation and
Impaired-Driving Cases in Washington State, 30 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 599 (2006)
(discussing a study showing that topiramate (Topamax), a drug that was FDAapproved for use in seizure disorders (epilepsy), and which was very popular for OLU,
was involved in a seemingly disproportionate number and percentage of cases
referred to a state lab in Washington State, suggesting that excessive OLU was causally
responsible); Lisa A. Ladewski et al., Dissemination of Information on Potentially Fatal
Adverse Drug Reactions for Cancer Drugs from 2000 to 2002, 21 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
3859, 3859–64 (2003) (discussing a study showing that serious, including fatal,
adverse drug reactions that were not known upon FDA approval for the original indication, can show up even years later; and calling for expanded and increased vigilance
to accrue data on the potential danger of these drugs used both on- and off-label);
Gina Kolata, Drug that Stops Bleeding Shows Off-Label Dangers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011,
at D1.
17 See infra note 71 (discussing the case of Rituximab or Rituxan in this regard).
18 See Kolata, supra note 16; infra notes 113–20 and accompanying text (discussing this doctrine and its history).
19 See Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 716 (Md. 2006) (“ ‘[A] claim for lack of
informed consent focuses . . . on the adequacy of the explanation given by the physician in obtaining the patient’s consent.’ Therefore, the level of disclosure that is
required to be given by the physician is ‘measured by the patient’s need, and that
need is whatever is material to the decision.’ ” (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 165 (Md. 2002))); see also id. (citing
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successful,20 it is difficult to imagine that there is not a more material
fact than that a proposed treatment’s—in this case, an OLU’s—safety
and efficacy have not been established.
Second, people have the right not to be made the subjects of
medical experiments—in this case, not to be prescribed untested
OLU—unless they know about and have the capacity to acquiesce to
their inherent risks. Protestations to the contrary notwithstanding,21
this right, well-established internationally since the Nuremberg Trials,22 is broader than that which applies to “research subjects” as these
are currently defined by federal law.23 That is, federal law does not
consider unsupported OLU to be “research” when they are the result
of a treating physician’s prescription,24 whereas the same OLU are
“research” when they are the result of a principal investigator’s prescription.25 Leaving this federal regulatory wordplay aside, there can
precedent for “the proposition that a physician must disclose to the patient all information that a reasonable person would need to make his or her decision of whether
to undergo the procedure” and that “the standard for determining what information
must be disclosed by a physician in Maryland is whether a reasonable person in the
patient’s position would consider the data significant to the decision whether to submit to a particular treatment or procedure” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1152 (Md. 1993), and Wachter v. United
States, 877 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1989))).
20 See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (discussing this case law and noting that, in these cases, the courts themselves may not have been aware that many
OLU are unsupported by evidence of safety and efficacy and thus that in some circumstances, a drug’s FDA status may in fact be quite material to the patient’s
informed decision). Compare Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 71–72 (arguing that the
FDA status of a drug is not material to a patient’s medical decisionmaking and thus
does not have to be disclosed), with Johns, supra note 9, at 967–71 (arguing the contrary). Beck and Azari’s is the most prominently cited article on this issue, but even
they agree that the underlying facts about risk and efficacy are often material ones;
the only debatable issue, therefore, is whether (in their terms) FDA status is an appropriate “proxy” for safety and efficacy. See Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 72.
21 See, e.g., Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 72 (arguing that forcing physicians to
disclose “FDA regulatory status . . . would confound patient decisionmaking” and is
not necessary to meeting informed consent requirements).
22 See Robert D. Mulford, Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV.
99, 102 (1967) (noting that “[t]he concept of informed consent is central to any standard regulating research on human beings” and that it “was most strongly articulated”
in the Nuremberg Code).
23 See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (setting out related definitions).
24 This is because the regulation of medical practice has—for the most part—
remained outside of the federal government’s regulatory jurisdiction. See infra Part
I.A–B.
25 This is because the federal government has chosen to assume jurisdiction in
this different context. See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text (providing an
example from the case law).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-2\NDL204.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 7

5-MAY-11

regulation of physicians’ off-label prescribing

13:26

655

be no doubt that problematic OLU are experimental in the general
sense of that word, and thus that patients are subject to experimental
treatment without their knowledge when their physicians fail to disclose the relevant facts in advance.26 Indeed, proponents of unregulated OLU are otherwise generally forthcoming in describing their
motivation as assuring that this important avenue for “innovation”
remains unfettered.27
Beyond the individual patient, problematic OLU also cause harm
to society in the form of unnecessary increases in health care spending. Drugs are prescribed with little or no evidence that they will
work; the waste inherent in this effort is compounded if the built-in
delays (in securing effective treatment) result in increased costs of
care.28 Drugs are also prescribed for pseudodiseases, illnesses that are
poorly defined, thus causing unwarranted growth in pharmaceutical
costs.29 Finally, dangerous side effects causing physical harm and thus
additional medical care are more common with OLU than with drugs
used on-label.30
26 See Off-Label Use, supra note 2 (explaining that the reason “[m]any insurance
companies will not pay for” an OLU is because it is considered “ ‘experimental’ or
‘investigational’ ”).
27 See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 8, at 196–98 (elaborating on this innovations argument); cf. Christopher, supra note 5, at 247 (noting that, in general, “[t]he medical
community argues that overregulation chills innovation and reduces medicine to
‘cookbook’ therapy”).
28 See Dustin D. French et al., Letter to the Editor, How Well Do Psychotropic Medications Match Mental Health Diagnoses? A National View of Potential Off-Label Prescribing in
VHA Nursing Homes, 36 AGE & AGEING 107, 107–08 (2007); Kolata, supra note 16.
29 See Daria J. O’Reilly et al., The Unintended (and Costly) Effects Due to the Introduction of an Unrestricted Reimbursement Policy for Atypical Antipsychotic Medications in a Canadian Public Prescription Drug Program: 1996/97 to 2005/06, 16 CANADIAN J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 346, 352 (2009).
30 See A.P. Jonville-Béra et al., Are Incorrectly Used Drugs More Frequently Involved in
Adverse Drug Reactions? A Prospective Study, 61 EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 232, 235
(2005) (finding that off-label uses cause adverse drug reactions); Elin Kimland et al.,
Drug Related Problems and Off-Label Drug Treatment in Children as Seen at a Drug Information Centre, 166 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 527, 527–28, 531 (2007) (“Adverse drug reactions
[are] often associated with off-label drug treatment . . . .”). An argument to the contrary is that permitting OLU is good “cost-containment” because it does not require
society to incur the costs of expensive “FDA approval procedures.” See Salbu, supra
note 8, at 195. This argument essentially provides that because ascertaining safety
and efficacy is expensive, the project ought not (at least in some circumstances) be
undertaken. Or, more specifically, it is that pharmaceutical companies ought not be
made to bear the financial burdens of ascertaining the safety and efficacy of all of the
uses to which their products will be put, including the uses they specifically promote.
This argument is only valid if individuals and society are willing to bear the costs
associated with unsafe and ineffective drugs.
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In this Article, we argue that regulation of physicians’ OLU prescribing behavior is warranted to address these harms. Specifically, we
argue that when OLU are not justified by high-quality evidence of
safety and efficacy, they ought to be appropriately restricted. Notably,
this argument excepts OLU that are evidence-based, because these
are equivalent to FDA-approved uses. Many drug uses fit into this category and are, as a result, appropriately established as the relevant
standard of care.31
The argument that problematic OLU ought to be regulated is not
new or controversial. Against the consistent refrain that, in the interests of preserving this avenue of medical innovation, all OLU ought to
remain unregulated,32 scholars and policymakers have long urged regulation to protect patients’ interests in this context. In the modern
context, this latter view has been part of the more general movement
toward “evidence-based medicine” and away from treatment
approaches that lack evidentiary support.33 The problem is that regu31 There are a number of instances that meet these criteria. For example, the
chemotherapy drug daunorubicin is FDA approved “for remission induction in acute
nonlymphocytic leukemia (myelogenous, monocytic, erythroid) of adults,” Cerubidine
(Daunorubicin Hydrochloride) Injection, Powder, for Solution [Bedford Laboratories],
DAILYMED, http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?id=5821#nlm340
67-9 (last revised Nov. 2007), but is also a mainstay of treatment for the analogous
disease in children. See I.M. Hann et al., MRC Trials in Childhood Acute Myeloid Leukaemia, 83 ANNALS HEMATOLOGY S108, S108–12 (Feb. Supp. 2004).
32 See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text (noting this argument).
33 Much of the argument of this Article relies on the use of the term “evidencebased medicine” as the platform from which the evaluation of the efficacy, safety, and
utility of any therapeutic must be derived. Although it may be intuitively obvious that
physicians would make decisions and clinical recommendations using the best available data to justify the action chosen, it has not been (and is not) always the case.
Indeed, it is only in the last twenty years or so that academic medicine has formalized
processes to teach students how to approach, find, and evaluate the relevant medical
literature that forms the scientific grounding of modern medical practice. The origin
of both the term “evidence-based medicine” and the approach it designates is somewhat vague, but appears to have emerged in the early 1990s. See Jeffrey A. Claridge &
Timothy C. Fabian, History and Development of Evidence-Based Medicine, 29 WORLD J.
SURGERY 547, 547 (2005); Gordon H. Guyatt et al., Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature: II. How to Use an Article About Therapy or Prevention: Are the Results of the Study Valid?,
270 JAMA 2598, 2598–2601 (1993); Andrew D. Oxman et al., Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature: I. How to Get Started, 270 JAMA 2093, 2093–95 (1993). David L. Sackett,
in an influential editorial in the British Medical Journal, defined the term as follows:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of
current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual
patients. . . . By best available external clinical evidence we mean clinically
relevant research, often from the basic sciences of medicine, but especially
from patient centred clinical research into the accuracy and precision of
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latory approaches to date have not and, without more, likely cannot
solve the problem. Indeed, even if this is a matter of balancing the
interest in innovation against the interest in protecting patients’ welfare otherwise, a new approach is necessary.
The favorite target of regulators, restriction of pharmaceutical
companies’ promotion of problematic OLU,34 has been only marginally effective. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the companies’ incentives are almost entirely in the other direction: their
financial gains are directly related to the extent to which their products are used, experimentally or not, off-label.35 The most recent
twists on this old regulatory approach are unlikely to work because
they do nothing to alter these incentives. Indeed, to the contrary,
they were developed with the understanding that pharmaceutical
companies would inevitably continue to find ways to market OLU, and
with the hope that if this marketing could be controlled—specifically
by permitting the marketing only of OLU with third-party evidence of
safety and efficacy—patients’ welfare would be better protected.36
Recent revelations that pharmaceutical companies are paying third
parties to claim authorship of articles submitted to peer-reviewed jour-

diagnostic tests (including the clinical examination), the power of prognostic markers, and the efficacy and safety of therapeutic, rehabilitative, and
preventive regimens. External clinical evidence both invalidates previously
accepted diagnostic tests and treatments and replaces them with new ones
that are more powerful, more accurate, more efficacious, and safer.
David L. Sackett et al., Editorial, Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t,
312 BRIT. MED. J. 71, 71–72 (1996). Currently, coursework, lectures, and the like
constitute components of the curricula of most, if not all, medical schools in the
United States, and formal training in evidence-based data collection, analysis, and
implementation is required by both the American Boards of Internal Medicine and
Pediatrics. See, e.g., David B. Rueben, Chair’s Message, AM. BOARD INTERNAL MED.,
http://abim.org/about/board-of-directors/chairs-message.aspx (last visited Feb. 15,
2011) (stating that the board is focusing on data collection and evidence-based
medicine). Thus, it is fair to say that American physicians should be expected to be
expert arbiters of the available scientific literature evidence base (or lack of it) in
supporting any particular therapeutic modality.
34 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
35 As one commentator noted, “Companies regard the risk of multimillion-dollar
penalties [in this context] as just another cost of doing business.” Evans, supra note
13. Specifically, “[a]s large as the penalties are for drug companies caught breaking
the off-label law, the fines are tiny compared with the firms’ annual revenues.” Id.
For example, “[t]he $2.3 billion in fines and penalties Pfizer paid for marketing Bextra and three other drugs . . . amount to just 14 percent of its $16.8 billion in revenue
from selling those medicines from 2001 to 2008.” Id.
36 See infra Part II.A (setting out this argument).
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nals that are actually ghost written by company contractors37 lay bare
the fundamental flaw in this strategy: one can keep hoping and (more
pragmatically) fining the companies, but so long as the profits to be
made from unlawful marketing of OLU outweigh those fines, it is
rational for the companies to write them off as part of the cost of
doing business.
At least in part for this reason, commentators who continue to be
concerned about the implications of problematic OLU have renewed
older calls for nonbinding professional standards to govern physicians’ prescribing behavior.38 This latter step is particularly important, because it signals the recognition that a comprehensive strategy
regulating all relevant actors, or else a targeted strategy focusing on
the physician-patient relationship, is more likely to be effective than
one focusing exclusively on manufacturers. Proposals to regulate physicians’ OLU, even if only through nonbinding professional standards,
also reflect the recognition that physicians share responsibility for
their implications. The problem with this alternative approach is that
nonbinding standards often go unheeded. This is perhaps especially
true in circumstances where the audience is, as physicians are, inculcated in a culture that has long viewed professional independence as
normative.39
It is for these reasons that we argue in this Article on behalf of
binding legal regulation of physicians’ related prescribing behavior.
Such regulation is likely to be effective because physicians are the
most immediate link between drugs and the patients who would take
them; in legal parlance, unlike pharmaceutical companies, physicians
37 See Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo, Ghostwriting at Elite Academic Medical Centers in the United States, PLOS MED., Feb. 2010, http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/
info:doi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000230; Stephanie Saul, Merck Wrote Drug
Studies for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at C1; Natasha Singer, Medical Papers by
Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A1.
38 See Dresser & Frader, supra note 5. This call revives an earlier theme in the
literature. See Arthur S. Levine, Clinical Trials and the Community Physician, 51 CANCER
2498, 2498–2502 (1983) (addressing and promoting the introduction of protocols in
community hospitals for testing new therapeutic techniques); Robert J. Levine, The
Boundaries Between Biomedical or Behavioral Research and the Accepted and Routine Practice
of Medicine, in NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH app. I, at 1-1 to 1-44 (1978)
[hereinafter THE BELMONT REPORT]; Legal Implications of the Boundaries Between
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects and the Accepted or Routine Practice of
Medicine, in THE BELMONT REPORT, supra, app. II, at 16-44 to 16-45.
39 See Celia Davies, Editorial, Getting Health Professionals to Work Together, 320 BRIT.
MED. J. 1021, 1021–22 (2000) (discussing research displaying the need for more collaboration on the part of doctors and hospital staff).
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are the “direct cause” of patients’ OLU. Regulating physicians is also
likely to be effective because their incentives are fundamentally different from those that guide pharmaceutical companies. That is, physicians’ bottom line is not generally tied to the number and amount of
OLU they “sell” by prescription. Rather, it is tied to doing right by
their patients, and, consequently, to their professional reputations.
In contrast with the widely held view that pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of problematic OLU ought to be regulated, our argument to regulate physicians’ promotion (by prescription) of these
same OLU is new and it will be controversial. This society has a strong
tradition of deference to physicians’ autonomy and judgment in the
context of the physician-patient relationship. It is generally held that
it is in the interests of patients for the physicians who know them best
to be able to make unfettered treatment decisions, including resorting
to innovative therapy when the circumstances require. Physicians’
right to make unregulated treatment decisions is intended, at least in
part, to protect patients’ right to use whatever treatment they wish
and, relatedly, to decide in the privacy of the physician-patient relationship what this treatment should be.40 These views are so strongly
held that physicians’ prescribing practices, both in general, and with
respect to OLU in particular, have never been effectively regulated.41
To the contrary, the prevailing laissez-faire approach suggests that
even discussing such regulation is taboo.42
It is essential that physicians retain substantial freedom to exercise judgment and even, when necessary, to innovate in their patients’
best interests. However, we disagree that absolutely unfettered physician liberty is a necessary or appropriate way to achieve these ends.
Even our most fundamental individual liberties—those described in
the Bill of Rights, including parental autonomy, religious freedom,
the sanctity of the home, and so on—are restricted and violable in
certain circumstances. Since it is patients’ best interests that justify
physicians’ liberty in the first instance, their interests must also be an
appropriate basis for restrictions on that liberty. More specifically, it is
an anachronism in this modern era of evidence-based medicine to
40 See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting
Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 47, 58–63 (1994) (discussing physicians’ traditional discretion).
41 See infra Part I (describing the dearth of effective regulation in additional
detail).
42 See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 5, at 247 (noting that “physicians attack some
attempts to regulate medicine with the vigor of an artist resisting censorship” and that
“[t]he medical community argues that overregulation chills innovation and reduces
medicine to ‘cookbook’ therapy”).
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suggest that physicians ought to be unrestricted as they engage in
innovation; innovation is, after all, simply a euphemism for experimentation, however well intended. To suggest that physicians are not
required to inform their patients that they are innovating as they treat
is particularly anathema.
To argue that physicians’ OLU-prescribing behavior ought to be
legally regulated in the interests of their patients is only to begin the
discussion. The nature of the restrictions, the identity of the regulator(s), and appropriate penalties for violations, if any, all need to be
addressed. We do not propose a particular “best solution” in this Article; to do so would be premature given this society’s long and largely
unaltered history of deference to physicians’ good faith and judgment. Rather, our project is primarily to make the case for legal regulation, with a view toward initiating what we hope will be a new and
serious discussion of the possibilities for and advantages and disadvantages of particular approaches.
To these ends, Part I describes the existing regulatory landscape,
Part II makes the case for binding legal regulation of physicians’ OLUprescribing behavior, and Part III provides a framework for next steps,
including a discussion of the necessary elements of a sound regulatory
regime and possible institutional approaches. The Article concludes
that although the physician-patient relationship is sacrosanct, it cannot be privileged at the expense of the welfare of the very individuals
it is designed to protect. Providing for careful and meaningful restrictions on physicians’ OLU-prescribing behavior ultimately strikes a better balance among the relevant interests than does the “laissez-faire”
approach that prevails today.
I. EXISTING TREATMENT

OF

PHYSICIANS’ OLU

The prevalence of OLU in medical practice is often noted and
well understood, at least within the relevant professional communities. More obscure is that OLU, including physicians’ OLU, are effectively unregulated. This regulatory vacuum is the result of the federal
government’s decision to leave to the states the regulation of medical
practice within their borders; the states’ decision generally to defer to
the medical profession, allowing it substantially to self-regulate; and
the medical profession’s decision with respect to OLU in particular to
suggest a nonbinding gold standard of evidence-based medicine,
which has the effect of recommending but not mandating any particular prescribing behavior. Those who study this area understand the
larger implications of these individual deferences. However, it is
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often the case that even knowledgeable decisionmakers believe that
they do not need to regulate because someone else is doing this work.
A. The Federal Government
There are two federal institutions with related jurisdiction: the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institutes of
Health (NIH). Neither regulates physicians’ OLU.
The FDA was established in the early twentieth century to regulate purveyors of false and harmful elixirs: in other words, (bad) drug
manufacturers and distributors.43 It was never intended to regulate
physicians or the drugs’ ultimate consumers; indeed, the doctorpatient relationship in particular has always been considered off limits
by the federal government for regulatory purposes.44 The FDA is
responsible for authorizing manufacturers to conduct clinical trials of
experimental drugs, for approving drugs for specific uses where those
uses have been found to be safe and effective after clinical trials, for
approving the labels and marketing materials that accompany
approved drugs once they are distributed in the marketplace, and for
sanctioning drug companies when they are found to have improperly
promoted unapproved (including off-label) uses of their products.
The FDA’s actions do affect physicians’ and patients’ choices when it
allows or disallows the distribution of particular products by their
43 See Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 618–20 (1993); Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting Public
Health from Outside the Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety
Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117,
125 (2007).
44 See Salbu, supra note 8, at 190–91. As one court recently wrote with respect to
OLU in particular,
[t]he FDA has always recognized that the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetics] Act
does not . . . limit the manner in which a physician may use an approved
drug. Once a product has been approved for marketing, a physician may
choose to prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in approved labeling. The FDA also observes that
accepted medical practice often include[s] drug use that is not reflected in
approved drug labeling.
Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 919 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Morlino v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., 706 A.2d 721, 730 (N.J.
1998)); see also id. at 918 (“ ‘[O]ff-label’ usage of medical devices ‘is an accepted and
necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without directly interfering with the practice of medicine.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Buckman Co.
v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001))). The two exceptions to this
rule are clinical trials with patient/subjects, see 21 C.F.R. § 50 (2010); id. § 56; 45
C.F.R. § 46 (2010), and the regulation of narcotics, amphetamines, and hallucinogens, see Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2006).
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manufacturers, or when it requires aftermarket revisions (including
warnings) to physician package inserts,45 but the effect is only
indirect.
One could understand OLU as a form of clinical research, especially those situations in which the OLU is innovative or lacks a firm
evidentiary base of support. In these cases OLU could fall under the
regulatory umbrella of the NIH. The NIH’s Office of Human Subjects
Research (OHSR) is responsible for the regulation of “human subjects research,” and local Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are
charged with the application and implementation of these policies
and regulations to ensure both the safety of the subjects and the integrity of the experiments in which they are taking part.46 “Human subjects research” is a statutory term of art that “means a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”47
This is both intentionally and expressly a narrow conception of
research. As the Code of Federal Regulations states:
Research subject to regulation, and similar terms are intended to
encompass those research activities for which a federal department
or agency has specific responsibility for regulating as a research
activity, (for example, Investigational New Drug requirements
administered by the Food and Drug Administration). It does not
include research activities which are incidentally regulated by a federal department or agency solely as part of the department’s or
agency’s broader responsibility to regulate certain types of activities
whether research or non-research in nature . . . .48
45 See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of such
aftermarket actions on medical malpractice actions).
46 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(g)–(j) (defining Institutional Review Boards and their
approval process); Office of Human Subjects Research, OHSR Information Sheets/Forms,
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Nov. 20, 2006), http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/info/sheet1.html (discussing the OHSR’s responsibilities).
47 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d). A “human subject” for purposes of this policy is
defined as “a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or
student) conducting research obtains (1) [d]ata through intervention or interaction
with the individual, or (2) [i]dentifiable private information.” Id. § 46.102(f).
“[G]eneralizable knowledge” is “knowledge related to health that can be applied to
populations outside the population being studied. That is, participants in a research
project may or may not benefit directly from the study, but a larger group is expected
to gain from the knowledge obtained in the study.” 102.2 Organizational Policy on the
Definition of Research as It Applies to Clinical Practice and Public Health Activities, JOHNS
HOPKINS MED. (Sept. 2007), http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/institutional_review_
board/guidelines_policies/organization_policies/102_2.html.
48 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e).
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By definition, the term “human subjects research” also does not
include research, experimental, and innovative activities involving
human subjects that are entirely outside of the purview of the federal
government.49
Because IRBs and the OHSR have never considered even experimental or innovative OLU to be “human subjects research,” these
institutions have never sought to govern physicians’ related prescribing.50 There are several explanations for this, including primarily that
the doctor-patient relationship is involved and, as we have already
explained, this relationship is generally considered to be off limits to
federal regulators.51 Relatedly, aside from a few quite famous historical examples of doctors using their patients or others to obtain generalizable knowledge,52 the doctor-patient relationship—typically
characterized by the intent of the physician to cure or alleviate the
individual patient’s condition using either established or innovative
approaches—has not looked like that which these institutions were
charged with regulating.53 Thus, even when a physician’s OLU could
be considered to be entirely experimental,54 the fact that it is directed
at a patient who, it is at least hoped, may be helped by the treatment is
sufficient to take it out of the purview of IRBs and the OHSR. There
are no other federal agencies with relevant jurisdiction.
49 In addition to OLU, well-known examples of experimental or innovative activity that falls outside of the jurisdiction of the OHSR include some types of stem cell
and recombinant DNA research. See id. § 46.101(a)–(i) (describing research to which
this policy applies). However, all clinical research using human subjects is regulated
by the OHSR, no matter what the funding source (private or government). See id.
§ 46.101(a).
50 See supra notes 47–49 (distinguishing “human subjects research” from innovative medical practice on the basis that the former is to obtain generalizable knowledge
and the latter is to cure or alleviate an individual patient’s condition).
51 See supra note 42.
52 See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57
DUKE L.J. 517, 530–31 (2007) (describing experiments on children as patients).
53 Physician-patient relationships that involve, in addition to diagnosis and treatment, formal enrollment of the patients in studies designed to test the merits of OLU
are the exception to this proposition. These patients and their physicians acting as
investigators are subject to the federal regulations governing human subjects
research. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a) (2010); id. § 56.101; 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a)–(i). The
difference for these patients is that the intent of the studies is not to cure or alleviate
their particular symptoms, but rather to gather generalizable knowledge about their
condition.
54 Our use of the term “experimental” refers not to a research endeavor, one
aimed towards generating knowledge applicable to others, but rather to one in which
the outcome is unknown and cannot be predicted with a high degree of confidence.
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B. The States
The assumption underlying the federal government’s hands-off
approach to the physician-patient relationship, and thus to physicians’
OLU, is that the regulation of medical practice is mostly a matter of
local and professional concern, best left to the states individually to
regulate.55 In general, the states’ approach to this deference has been
two pronged. First, the states require that physicians practicing within
their boundaries be licensed by their medical boards. Second, they
have evolved medical malpractice law to compensate patients who are
injured by their doctors’ negligent care. Neither the licensing
requirement nor malpractice law effectively restricts physicians’ problematic OLU.
1. The Licensing Requirement
In all fifty states the practice of medicine is authorized and regulated by individual medical boards, which are in turn governed by
analogous statutory rules and laws or medical practice acts. Individual
state-regulated licensing of physicians was officially sanctioned in 1889
when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that West Virginia’s police power
authority to safeguard the public welfare encompassed the right to
demand that physicians have certain qualifications of education and
skill.56 This was followed by the landmark Flexner Report in 1910,
which called for the standardization of medical education and state
regulation of medical schools and their graduates.57 Not only did the
so-called for-profit proprietary schools quickly go out of business, leading to a significant contraction in the number of institutions available
for medical education, but the curricula of the “survivors” became
increasingly uniform, adhering to Flexner’s call for a more sciencebased education, consistent with the rapid emergence of scientific
medicine.58 In 1912, the state medical boards established the Federation of State Medical Boards, an organization that continues to this
day to coordinate pre- and postgraduate educational requirements,
55 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
56 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121–23 (1889). The Court also held that
such a licensing requirement could not be construed as a restraint of trade. Id.
57 See ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
passim (1910); Andrew H. Beck, The Flexner Report and the Standardization of American
Medical Education, 291 JAMA 2139, 2139–40 (2004).
58 Indeed, this was probably the first official endorsement of “evidence-based
medicine.” See supra note 33.
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and ongoing skill and continuing medical educational assessments for
practicing physicians.59
To receive a medical license, a physician must not only graduate
from an accredited medical school, but she must also pass a three-part
examination, complete postgraduate clinical training from an accredited hospital residency program, and be judged to be of “good character.” Further, licenses are renewed periodically (in the authors’ state
of North Carolina, there is annual renewal60) in which physicians
must present evidence of their continued ability to practice high-quality and ethical medicine, including their accumulation of designated
numbers of continuing education credits in their field. However,
there is no microexamination of how they practice or their philosophical approach to pharmaceutical prescribing. Thus, the medical licensing boards are not well placed either to regulate or even investigate
anything other than the most grievous violations of medical standards,
generally brought to their attention by disgruntled or poorly served
patients, or occasionally by law enforcement authorities. Although
the boards have the authority to suspend, limit, or even permanently
revoke a doctor’s license for a wide variety of violations of law or standards of practice, they tend to grant great leeway to physicians in the
way they care for their patients and prescribe medicines.61 Since federal law, state medical practice statutes, and professional codes of ethics do not aim to regulate the private practice of medicine (except
within the broad boundaries just described), scrutiny of off-label use is
generally off limits.62

59 See FSMB Mission & Goals, FED’N STATE MED. BOARDS, http://www.fsmb.org/
mission.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011); FSMB History, FED’N STATE MED. BOARDS,
http://www.fsmb.org/history.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011); Policy Documents, FED’N
STATE MED. BOARDS, http://www.fsmb.org/grpol_policydocs.html (last visited Feb.
12, 2011).
60 See Continuing Medical Education (CME) FAQs, N.C. MED. BOARD, http://ncmed
board.org/faqs/list/category/continuing_medical_education_cme (last visited Feb.
12, 2011).
61 See State of the States: Physician Regulation 2009, FED’N STATE MED. BOARDS, 6,
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2009_state_of_states.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2011)
(“While medical boards sometimes find it necessary to suspend or revoke licenses,
regulators have found many problems can be resolved with additional education or
training in appropriate areas. . . . This compromise protects the public while maintaining a valuable community resource in the physician.”).
62 For information on licensure requirements, see Becoming a Physician: Medical
Licensure, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/
becoming-physician/medical-licensure.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
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2. Medical Malpractice Law
Medical malpractice law sets enforceable standards of practice
and provides meaningful sanctions for violation of those standards.
However, this law is particularly ineffective as a regulatory mechanism
for physicians’ OLU. This is specifically in contrast to the law’s effectiveness in regulating physicians’ competence in other respects,
including standards of care in evaluating patients, conducting procedures, and meeting informed consent obligations. The ineffectiveness of medical malpractice law as a tool to regulate physicians’ OLU
has everything to do with yet a second deference—this time by the
states’ judiciaries, which administer this law—to physicians’ collective
and individual judgments. This particular deference is not surprising,
as medical malpractice law in general reflects the standard of care as
set by the medical profession, not by the judiciary or juries.63 There is
no indication that proposals for tort reform or medical malpractice
reform include mandates to the legislatures to alter this deferential
approach.
The best indication of the ineffectiveness of medical malpractice
law as a tool to regulate OLU is probably the dearth of published
cases, either reported (useful as precedent in future cases) or unreported (officially unavailable as precedent) in which off-label use by a
medical provider was a focus of the plaintiff’s case. Furthermore, the
substance of the published decisions reinforces the suggestion from
the numbers that off-label prescribing is a weak basis for finding liability against a physician. Specifically, state courts over the past ten years
have published approximately thirty such decisions, only a very few of
which can be interpreted as restrictive of physicians’ off-label practices.64 Although this may not represent all of the cases filed—for
63 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 633 (2001). As Professor Dobbs
explains:
The standard of care is not the reasonable person standard used in most
negligence cases. The reasonable person standard asks the trier to weigh
the reasonableness, that is at least in part to weigh the risks and utilities of
the defendant’s conduct; but the professional standard asks the trier only to
determine whether the defendant’s conduct conformed to the medical standard or medical custom in the relevant community. Thus under the traditional rule, as long as a doctor follows the medical standard or custom, he is
not negligent, regardless of how risky the custom or how unnecessary.
Id.
64 This number is the result of a Westlaw search in February 2010 according to
the following criteria: the database was “allstates” and the search terms were “medical
w/1 malpractice & off w/1 label.” The same result was obtained when the search
terms were changed to “medical w/1 malpractice & off-label.” The cases that we
describe as arguably restrictive of physicians’ off-label practices are those described in
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example, some may have settled and some decisions may not have
been published—the small number strongly suggests the weakness of
this legal theory as a litigation strategy. Medical malpractice law is
only effective as regulation if plaintiffs’ lawyers are willing to bring
cases, and the contingency fee system assures that, in the main, they
will be unwilling to bring cases that are unlikely to be successful.
Most important is that the cases evidence strong deference to the
professional judgment of individual physicians. Indeed, to the extent
that a reliable generalization is possible from the relatively small number of cases, it is that the law is even more solicitous of physicians’
right to exercise independent professional judgment about what their
patients need, including when to use particular drugs, than the relevant American Medical Association (AMA) policy. Specifically, where
that policy confirms physicians’ right to use drugs off-label when such
use is based on “sound scientific evidence and . . . medical opinion”65—in other words, when it is consistent with evidence-based
medicine—and recommends particular compendia and the peerreviewed literature in this regard, the law suggests that they can deviate from that policy when, exercising the “degree of skill and proficiency which is commonly experienced by the ordinary, skillful,
careful and prudent physician,”66 they determine that their patients
could benefit from different treatment.67 As the Supreme Court of
Missouri recently held in a case against a doctor who used chelation
therapy to treat patients with vascular conditions contrary to a specific
AMA policy that identified its use in this context as “an experimental
process without proven efficacy,”68
notes 67–72 and accompanying text. These involve the decision of some courts to
permit malpractice plaintiffs to introduce physician package inserts into evidence to
establish the standard of care.
65 H-120.988 Patient Access to Treatments Prescribed by Their Physicians, AM. MED.
ASS’N, https://ssl3.ama-assn.org/apps/ecomm/PolicyFinderForm.pl?site=www.amaassn.org&uri=/ama1/pub/upload/mm/PolicyFinder/policyfiles/HnE/H-120.988.
HTM (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
66 See Silberstein v. Berwald, 460 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo. 1970).
67 See, e.g., State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123
S.W.3d 146, 164 (Mo. 2003) (noting in the context of a case challenging a physician’s
off-label use of chelation therapy that “[p]hysicians are afforded considerable leeway
in the use of professional judgment to decide on appropriate treatments, especially
when applying the negligence standard. For instance, [another] medical negligence
case, holds that ‘as long as there is room for an honest difference of opinion among
competent physicians, a physician who uses his own best judgment cannot be convicted of negligence, even though it may afterward develop that he was mistaken.’ ”
(quoting Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d. 108, 114 (Mo. 1967))).
68 See id. at 150 (quoting from the AMA’s position statement on the off-label use
of chelation therapy, which also included the admonitions that “(1) [t]here is no
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[a]pplication of this standard does not merely require a determination of what treatment is most popular [among members of the
medical profession or the medical specialization in question.] Were
that the only determinant of skill and learning, any physician who
used a medicine for off-label purposes, or who pursued unconventional courses of treatment, could be found to have etngaged in . . .
negligence . . . .69

In other words, the AMA policy suggests an aspirational standard of
care: that before physicians give their patients drugs off-label, some
sort of experimenting has to have been done by someone else so that
the compendia and literature already reflect the particular benefits of
such use. The law does not contain this restriction.70
The AMA’s aspirations notwithstanding, the medical profession
itself often fails to heed these pronouncements. That is, the medical
standard of care—which the law borrows as its standard for purposes
of medical malpractice liability—is not a reliable proxy for safety and
efficacy because it is based on accepted practice, and accepted practice does not have to be and is often not evidence based.71 Indeed, if
scientific documentation that the use of chelation therapy is effective in the treatment
of cardiovascular disease, atherosclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, and cancer; [and] (2)
chelation therapy proponents should conduct controlled studies and adhere to FDA
research guidelines if they want the therapy to be accepted more broadly” (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); H-175.994 Chelations Therapy,
AM. MED. ASS’N (2004), https://ss13.ama-assn.org/apps/ecomm/PolicyFinderform.
pl?site=www.ama-assn.org&uri=/ama1/pub/upload/mm/PolicyFinder/policyfiles/
HnE/H-175.994.HTM; see also Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No. 95-58737,
1999 WL 811334, at *17 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 7, 1999) (“Once a device has been
cleared for labeling for one use, physicians in their private practice may use it in any
manner they deem medically appropriate, including uses being studied pursuant to
an IDE.”).
69 McDonagh, 123 S.W.2d at 159.
70 See id. at 165 (noting, in response to the claim that a physician failed to abide
by AMA guidelines, that “medicine is not readily regulated by a standard cookbook or
set of rules”). The court in McDonagh even went so far as to suggest that physicians
could properly use a therapy off-label that was generally held to be ineffective so long
as it was otherwise harmless and patients could be healed by believing in its curative
properties:
Medicine is an art, as well as a science, as its practitioners are taught. It is
also a dynamic field, where beliefs about what is conventional therapy can
change over time. What is effective treatment is often a combination, not
just of art and science, but of belief. The patient may get better if the
patient is convinced of the usefulness of the therapy.
Id. at 166.
71 See Philip M. Rosoff, Can Underpowered Clinical Trials Be Justified?, IRB: ETHICS
HUM. RES., May–June 2004, at 16, 16. The story of bone marrow transplants and
breast cancer is illustrative. In 1986 doctors reported using very high doses of chemo-
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therapy to eliminate residual cancer in patients with advanced disease and “rescuing”
them with using their own bone marrow. The initial, noncontrolled, results were
impressive, thus providing proof of principle in terms of both feasibility and potential
efficacy. See J. Paul Eder et al., High-Dose Combination Alkylating Agent Chemotherapy
with Autologous Bone Marrow Support for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 4 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
1592, 1592 (1986); W.P. Peters et al., High-Dose Combination Alkylating Agents with Autologous Bone Marrow Support: A Phase 1 Trial, 4 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 646, 652–53
(1986). The data were impressive enough that others adopted the approach and it
became the “standard of care.” Public pressure built to provide this “miracle” therapy
to women and have insurance companies pay for it. See RICHARD A. RETTIG ET AL.,
FALSE HOPE passim (2007). This practice was so accepted that a number of patients
successfully sued their insurance companies when they were denied coverage for
autologous transplantation for breast cancer. See, e.g., Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 1995) (granting plaintiff’s requested injunctive
relief on the basis that her insurance “plan covers HDCT for other types of cancer for
which it is an accepted treatment, and . . . she has shown considerable unrebutted
evidence that HDCT is an accepted breast cancer treatment with significantly higher
success rates than standard chemotherapy”). Unfortunately, when Phase 3 randomized trials were eventually performed some years later, the results of these trials
demonstrated that the benefit of autotransplantation for advanced breast cancer was
marginal at best. See Martin S. Tallman et al., Conventional Adjuvant Chemotherapy with
or Without High-Dose Chemotherapy and Autologous Stem-Cell Transplantation in High-Risk
Breast Cancer, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 17, 17 (2003); Sjoerd Rodenhuis et al., High-Dose
Chemotherapy with Hematopoietic Stem-Cell Rescue for High-Risk Breast Cancer, 349 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 7, 14–15 (2003); C. Farquhar et al., High Dose Chemotherapy and Autologous
Bone Marrow or Stem Cell Transplantation Versus Conventional Chemotherapy for Women with
Metastatic Breast Cancer, 1 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS., 2005, at 2 (D.O.I.:
10.1002/14651858.CD0031342); Gerald J. Elfenbein, Editorial, Stem-Cell Transplantation for High-Risk Breast Cancer, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 80, 80–82 (2003); H. Gilbert
Welch & Juliana Mogielnicki, Presumed Benefit: Lessons from the American Experience with
Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1088, 1091–92 (2002).
Hence, many thousands of women were treated according to the guiding wisdom of
their doctors, hewing to the prescribed guidelines embodied by the accepted wisdom
within the standard of care.
The story of rituximab (Rituxan) is similarly illustrative. This drug is a product
of genetic engineering and is FDA approved for use in non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. See
Rituxan (Nituximab) Injection, Solution [Genentech, Inc.], DAILYMED, http://dailymed.
nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?id=16017 (last revised Jan. 2010). However, it is
now prescribed for a wide variety of unapproved uses. See Richard Imrich et al.,
Autoimmune Autonomic Ganglionopathy: Treatment by Plasma Exchanges and Rituximab, 19
CLINICAL AUTONOMIC RES. 259, 259–62 (2009); A.Ø. Jensen et al., Treatment of Treatment-Resistant Autoimmune Blistering Skin Disorders with Rituximab, 160 BRIT. J. DERMATOLOGY 1359, 1359–61 (2009); C. Lebrun et al., Successful Treatment of Refractory
Generalized Myasthenia Gravis with Rituximab, 16 EUR. J. NEUROLOGY 246, 246–49
(2009); Brigitta U. Mueller et al., One Year Follow-Up of Children and Adolescents with
Chronic Immune Thrombocytopenic Purpura (ITP) Treated with Rituximab, 52 PEDIATRIC
BLOOD CANCER 259, 259–61 (2009); V. Torrente-Segarra et al., Clinical, Biological and
Ultrasonographic Remission in a Patient with Musculoskeletal Systemic Lupus Erythematosus
with Rituximab, 18 LUPUS 270, 270–72 (2009). There have been several alerts from the
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it were required either by the medical profession itself or by law that
the accepted practice be evidence based, many patients, including
some children and individuals with rare or unusual diseases, would
receive no treatment at all.72
In any event, to the extent that some (but not all) states’ case law
suggests anything that could be considered restrictive of physicians’
OLU, it is only in the requirement that, when treating patients, providers must take account of relevant information from physician package inserts, also included in the Physician’s Desk Reference (PDR), about
proper product use (in the context of medical devices) and (in the
case of medical devices and drugs) contraindications, including those
discovered aftermarket and set out in amended product labels.73
Notably, however, the requirement is merely that medical providers
take this information into account, not that they tailor their uses
based on it regardless of the circumstances otherwise. Thus, in jurisdictions that adhere to this approach, physician package inserts proffered by the plaintiff-patients are admissible as evidence of the
standard of care so long as they are accompanied by expert testimony
supporting this claim.74 Defendant-doctors who can muster evidence
that the physician package inserts do not reflect the standard of
care—for example, evidence that in the unique circumstances pertinent to the care of a specific patient, the information in the package
inserts was inapplicable, outweighed by other factors, or that there
were other acceptable approaches—will be found not liable.
Jurisdictions that reject this approach do not permit plaintiffpatients to introduce package inserts as evidence of the standard of
care because they believe that juries could be misled by the negative

FDA after reports of severe and occasionally fatal reactions to this drug, finally resulting in a so-called “black box” warning (added to the required drug information package insert data sheet). Most of these warnings came after unexpected side effects
occurred in patients receiving rituximab for OLU. See Rituximab (Marketed as Rituxan)
Information: FDA Alert [12/18/2006], http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm109106.htm (last updated
Jan. 21, 2010).
72 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 15–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“The
great weight of authority is that a drug’s labeling or its parallel PDR reference is
admissible, as long as it is accompanied by other expert evidence regarding the standard of care.”). This requirement has been established indirectly, as a result of the
evidentiary value of package inserts to establish the standard of care. This point is
discussed in additional detail in the text.
74 See id.
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implication that OLU are necessarily inappropriate.75 As one court
recently explained:
[I]f we were to allow the package insert into evidence . . . , the jury
would be allowed to consider the statements in the insert for the
truth of what they assert: that there is only one way to use the [drug
or device]. In an age where drugs are frequently used for purposes
not approved by the FDA, we decline to set such a precedent. . . .
[W]e understand package inserts for pharmaceuticals and medical
devices to represent recommendations by the manufacturer, not
comprehensive instruction as to the use of the drug or device.76

In such jurisdictions medical providers are not required by malpractice law to take the information contained in package inserts into
account except to the extent that this information otherwise reflects
the standard of care.77
Not only does malpractice law permit medical providers substantial freedom to use drugs off-label and as they see fit, it also permits
them to make this choice without informing their patients that the use
is off-label.78 The case law involving informed consent claims based in
off-label prescribing is also very sparse, and most of it relates to the
off-label use of devices rather than drugs. However, to the extent that
this case law is probative, it suggests that—regardless of the nature
and extent of the evidentiary support for a particular use—off-label
status is not material to patients’ ability to make informed decisions
about their options. This notwithstanding that “[t]he test for determining whether a particular risk must be disclosed is its materiality to
75 See Arnold v. Lee, 720 N.W.2d 194, 2006 WL 1410161, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May
24, 2006) (unpublished table decision) (upholding district court’s refusal to admit
package insert into evidence because of the “risk for unfair prejudice”). Jurisdictions
that permit the introduction of package inserts to establish the standard of care are
also concerned with their potential to mislead juries about the propriety of off-label
uses, but this concern is addressed not by prohibiting their use as evidence but by
requiring the simultaneous production of an expert to establish that the inserts do in
fact reflect the standard of care. See, e.g., Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 15–17.
76 Arnold, 2006 WL 1410161, at *3.
77 It is unclear which approach reflects the majority view. Jurisdictions in both
camps purport to do so. Compare id. (“[W]e find that a slight majority do not allow
the insert for the truth of the matters asserted within.”), with Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at
15 (“Virtually every court addressing this question has concluded that the drug’s
labeling and PDR reference are relevant to the standard of care issue.”).
78 See, e.g., Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 918 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(“The majority view . . . represented by the recent decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court . . . is that the doctrine of informed consent does not require surgeons to advise patients of the FDA investigational status of pedicle screws.”); Johns,
supra note 9, at 1013 (“[R]esearch has disclosed no case holding that the doctrine of
informed consent requires a doctor to disclose that a prescription is off label.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-2\NDL204.txt

672

unknown

Seq: 24

notre dame law review

5-MAY-11

13:26

[vol. 86:2

the patient’s decision, i.e., all risks potentially affecting the decision
must be divulged.”79
The view that off-label status is not material to a patient’s decision
to accept a particular course of treatment is rationalized on the wobbly ground that off-label status is a regulatory fact, not a medical fact,
and thus that it does “not speak directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular [use].”80 As one court recently emphasized in
this regard, “the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, and
therefore ‘the decision . . . is a matter of medical judgment, not of
regulatory approval.’ . . . Actions for informed consent are limited to
the nondisclosure of [material] medical information.”81 The device
in question in that case was a pedicle screw used off-label as an “internal fixation device” in the context of spinal fusion surgery.82 The fact
that the FDA had “classified pedicle screw systems as Class III devices,
‘experimental devices of unproven safety and efficacy’”83 and that the
agency had approved a study of pedicle screws that was ongoing at the
time of the plaintiff’s surgery and that required subjects to sign an
informed consent form “that described the use of these screws as
experimental”84 did not affect the court’s materiality finding. Indeed,
with respect to the relevance of the ongoing study, the court
explained that “[f]ederal regulations requiring that a patient be
informed that the medical device is investigational apply only to investigational studies. Plaintiff was not enrolled in an investigational protocol when the surgery was performed.”85
In other words, although the same experimental OLU was
involved, its nature as an experiment was material and thus subject to
informed consent requirements in the study setting but not in the
clinical setting. The court did not attempt to rationalize this differential treatment, but it is likely based on the view that permeates this
area of the law generally: that the physician-patient relationship
(unlike the researcher-subject relationship) is itself sufficient protection against the harms that are the focus of the informed consent pro79 Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 917.
80 Id. at 919 (quoting Southard v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d 101, 107 (Pa.
2001)). Of course, this rationale avoids the inconvenient truths that approved, i.e.,
“on-label,” uses are such precisely and only because they have been determined to be
safe and effective, and that safety and efficacy are central to medical decisionmaking.
81 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 225, 231
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996)).
82 Id. at 913.
83 Id. at 914.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 921 (citing Southard, 781 A.2d at 107–08).
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cess. Notably, the view that off-label status is immaterial to patients’
ability to make informed decisions about their care holds even in jurisdictions that are particularly protective of decisional autonomy, where
materiality is a question of fact that is to be established from the perspective of the ordinary prudent patient, not from the perspective of
the relevantly educated medical provider.86
Although we have not attempted to study the matter empirically,
we assume that most patients erroneously believe that the drugs their
doctors prescribe for them have been determined—somehow, by
someone—to be safe and effective for the uses to which they will be
put in their case, and thus that they would generally consider drugs’
regulatory status to be material to their decisionmaking because this
status is the most commonly understood proxy for safety and efficacy.87 In other words, although most patients would not necessarily
use the relevant terms of art, we assume that they understand the role
of the FDA to be to determine that drugs are safe and effective for the
uses to which they will in fact be put, either before they are marketed
to the public or postmarketing based on additional information developed in that context. We also assume that most patients erroneously
believe that some regulatory scheme, for example, the law or medical
ethics, prohibits physicians from experimenting with them, even
ostensibly for their own good, without their express permission.
Finally, we hypothesize that these patient views are especially likely to
be held in this period, in which patients are less likely than in the past
to have close relationships of trust with the particular medical providers who treat them, and in which medical research and the informed
consent process are increasingly lay topics. If we are correct in these
assumptions, it means that the law has made an unusual normative
(rather than factual) judgment about the materiality of regulatory status in this context; this normative judgment is entirely in physicians’
favor.88
86 See, e.g., id. at 917 (noting that “[t]he doctor’s duty of disclosure is measured
by the ‘prudent patient’ ” and not the “physician’s judgment”).
87 We base our view in part on intuition and anecdotal experience, and in part on
supportive reports. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (describing these
reports).
88 The Blazoski case provides some additional evidence that its materiality finding
was normative rather than fact based. Specifically, the court also rationalized its decision on “sound policy reasons” including that “[r]equiring disclosure may necessitate
a pre-surgery discourse by the physician on the mechanics of the FDA approval process which may dilute the significance of material, medical risks related to the procedure.” Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 920. In this context, the court quoted the following
language from a related law review article:

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-2\NDL204.txt

674

unknown

Seq: 26

notre dame law review

5-MAY-11

13:26

[vol. 86:2

****
In sum, state law affords physicians the liberty to engage in OLU,
including problematic OLU, without relevant constraints. Specifically, neither state licensing requirements nor medical malpractice
law restricts physicians’ OLU other than to require that they meet the
medical standard of care. However, to meet this standard in most
states, it is not necessary to show that the OLU is safe or effective; it is
not even required that physicians tell their patients about the dearth
of medical evidence supporting their treatment choice.
C.

The Medical Profession

Because the federal government generally delegates the regulation of medical practice to the states, and the states generally delegate
it to the profession, it is to the profession that we next turn for restriction or constraints on physicians’ OLU. There are two bodies with
relevant jurisdiction: state medical licensing boards and professional
organizations. However, neither of these organizations provides particularly useful protections. As described above, medical licensing
boards are not set up to micromanage medical practice, even though
they are authorized to react to substantive evidence of gross departures from standards of care, which could include some egregious prescribing practices.89
In 1847, the AMA issued what was arguably the first code of ethics
governing medical practice (the “AMA Code”).90 This effort was intimately entwined with the group’s continuing struggle to enhance and
improve the quality of medical education and the stature of doctors.
The AMA remains the dominant professional group purporting to
Patients . . . would be distracted from learning about the nature, risks, and
benefits of their treatments by regulatory information of de minimus value.
Such information would accentuate the errant notion that all off-label use is
by definition inherently risky, novel, or investigational. By implying risk or
novelty when there is none, these disclosures could frighten patients away
from the very therapies that actually are best for the treatment of their
conditions.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 101).
89 For example, Dr. J. Jemsek was sanctioned by the North Carolina Medical
Board for continually misdiagnosing patients as having chronic Lyme Disease and
prescribing long-term intravenous antibiotics. See Board Orders/Consent Orders/Other
Board Actions: July–August 2006, N.C. MED. BOARD, 2–3 (2006), http://www.ncmed
board.org/images/uploads/disciplinary_reports/ba57.pdf.
90 See AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1847), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/
1847code.pdf.
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represent physicians in the United States; however, it by no means
represents the majority,91 and the organization itself is quick to point
out that (only) its members must adhere to the principles set out in
the Code.92 That being said, the Code is more broadly influential;
most, if not all state medical societies (often affiliates of the AMA),
other medical professional organizations, and state licensing boards
adhere to many of its tenets.
The relevant Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA Code provide very generally that “[a] physician shall be dedicated to providing
competent medical care, with compassion and respect for human dignity and rights,”93 and that “[a] physician shall continue to study,
apply, and advance scientific knowledge, maintain a commitment to
medical education, make relevant information available to patients,
colleagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use the talents of
other health professionals when indicated.”94 An AMA policy statement that is specific to the matter of off-label prescribing “confirms”
both the organization’s “strong support for the autonomous clinical
decision-making authority of a physician and that a physician may lawfully use an FDA approved drug product . . . for an unlabeled indication when such use is based upon sound scientific evidence and sound
medical opinion.”95 With respect to a physician’s ethical obligation to
prescribe drugs off-label only when such use is “based upon sound
scientific evidence and . . . medical opinion,” the same statement
“encourages” but does not require physicians to use “three [particular] compendia . . . and the peer-reviewed literature for determining
the medical acceptability of unlabeled uses.”96 Thus, the AMA frowns
91 The AMA currently counts 236,153 members: this is fewer than thirty percent
of the listed physicians in the United States. Indeed, this may be a gross overestimate.
This number was current as of 2009 when it was obtained from the AMA. However, it
also includes students and retired doctors, so it is unclear the exact percentage of
practicing physicians who are members of the AMA. That the AMA membership represents a small minority of active doctors remains a valid point. See COUNCIL ON LONG
RANGE PLANNING & DEV., AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT NO. 3-A-09, DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES AND AMA LEADERSHIP (2009), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/41/clrdp-report-3-a09-demographic.pdf.
92 See DoctorFinder, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://webapps.ama-assn.org/doctorfinder/
home.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
93 Principles of Medical Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N (rev. ed. 2001), http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.shtml.
94 Id.
95 H-120.988 Patient Access to Treatments Prescribed by Their Physicians, supra note 65.
96 Id. The compendia referred to in the policy are the AMA’s own Drug Evaluations, the United States Pharmacopeia-Drug Information, Volume I, and the Ameri-

R
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upon, but does not prohibit, the off-label use of drugs in the absence
of a significant degree of scientific evidence supporting the proposed
use.
****
In summary, neither the federal government nor the states via
their medical licensing authority or malpractice laws has demonstrated a desire or willingness to restrain physicians from relatively
unrestricted off-label use of prescription drugs. Furthermore, the
medical profession itself, while professing an interest in limiting OLU
to applications with a firm base in scientific evidence, has failed to
exert any substantive power to implement effective regulation.
II. THE CASE

FOR

LEGAL REGULATION

OF

PHYSICIANS’ OLU

In this Part of the Article, we make the case that that physicians’
OLU ought to be regulated both to protect patients’ legitimate interests in evidence-based medicine and decisional autonomy and to
reduce health care costs associated with problematic OLU. Specifically, we argue that the physician-patient relationship is a particularly
effective point of regulation and that traditional rationales supporting
unfettered physicians’ liberty in this context are anachronistic and
insufficient in any event to outweigh the need for effective constraints.
can Hospital Formulary Service-Drug Information. It notes that the first two
compendia “currently are being merged as the result of an alliance between the
American Medical Association and the United States Pharmacopeia.” Id. Although
the policy statement purports to derive the AMA’s commitment to physicians’ reliance on “sound scientific evidence and sound medical opinion” from the law, it is in
fact only an ethical requirement. Id. To the extent the law is implicated in this aspect
of the policy statement, it is only in the permission it indirectly gives doctors to “use
an FDA-approved drug product . . . for an unlabeled indication.” Id. These compendia, while seemingly reliable and unimpeachable sources of unvarnished and trustworthy information about drugs and their uses that are supported by high-quality
information, are actually extensively open to exploitation and undue influence by the
drug companies. See ROSS MCKINNEY ET AL., WHITE PAPER: POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IN THE PRODUCTION OF DRUG COMPENDIA 6–7, 55–58 (2009), available at
http://www.cms.gov/determinationprocess/downloads/id64TA.pdf; Abernethy et
al., supra note 14, at 336. The reliability of compendia for accurate and unbiased
information may be improved by a provision included in the Medicare Improvements
for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-275, § 182(b), 122 Stat. 2494,
2583 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)), which explicitly requires these databases to openly declare any conflicts of interest and publicize
their methods. See Katherine Tillman et al., Compendia and Anticancer Therapy Under
Medicare, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 348, 349 (2009). However, the open declaration
of potential conflicts of interest is not always a reliable deterrent to avoiding them.
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A. An Effective Point of Regulation
Presumably to avoid regulation of the physician-patient relationship and because of the FDA’s restricted jurisdiction otherwise,97
efforts to address problematic OLU have largely focused upstream, on
restricting pharmaceutical companies’ promotions practices.98 The
notion underlying these restrictions is that if the flow of information
about OLU from pharmaceutical companies to physicians can be
slowed, physicians’ traditional discretion will remain at least formally
unaltered, but at the same time, they are likely to engage in better
prescribing practices. That is, because the universe of information
physicians receive about OLU is designed not to include biased information from pharmaceutical companies, prescriptions are more likely
to be safe and effective.
We have already demonstrated that this strategy has largely failed
to achieve its objective—biased information about OLUs continues to
flow relatively unabated from the companies to physicians, and problematic OLU continue to be prescribed at significant rates.99
Although we support continued efforts to shore up the restrictions on
pharmaceuticals’ promotions practices, we also support direct regulation of physicians’ prescribing practices. Regulation at the point of
the physician-patient relationship is likely to be effective in ways that
indirect regulation upstream, at the point of the relationship between
pharmaceutical companies and physicians, has not been.
First, this is because the incentives for physicians are different.
That is, unlike pharmaceutical companies, physicians’ bottom line in
general is not based on or even affected by sales of OLU. (We have
already noted the irony that evading restrictions on the promotion of
problematic OLU is good business for pharmaceutical companies,
which factor penalties into the cost of doing business and still reap
positive financial benefits.100) Rather, physicians’ bottom line is generally based on reputation and a successful medical practice. Indeed,
for the vast majority of physicians who are not involved in promoting
OLU on behalf of their manufacturers, it is largely irrelevant whether
a drug or biologic is an OLU or not; what matters is that it helps their
patients. This means that if sanctions for violating restrictions on
problematic OLU affect reputation and the opportunity for a successful medical practice, they are likely to be effective. They will deter
97
98
99
100

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

notes
notes
notes
notes

43–45 and accompanying text.
6, 34–37 and accompanying text (describing this focus).
6–8, 34–37 and accompanying text (discussing this failure).
34–37 and accompanying text (noting this point).
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unwarranted prescribing practices because most physicians would
have little or no reason even to try to absorb related losses.
Second, regulation of problematic OLU at the point of the physician-patient relationship is likely to be effective because it would manage the transmission that ultimately matters most: the transmission of
the medication to the patient who could be harmed by its use. To the
extent that this transmission can be managed successfully—either
restricted or qualified, depending on the state of the evidence supporting its use—it will have a net positive effect on patient welfare.
This is more than a “last clear chance” argument, although it is that
too. Earlier transmissions are only of information, which affects
patient welfare in the long run, but only indirectly. Most important,
even successful regulation upstream can never on its own effect the
changes sought, since physicians can and do engage in problematic
OLU even in the absence of manufacturers’ promotional efforts.
Thus, unless physicians’ prescribing practices are regulated, there will
always be problematic OLU and the risks of harm to patient welfare
they implicate.
B. The Case Against Traditional Physician Liberty
As far as we can tell, no one has yet lodged a serious argument in
favor of legal regulation of physicians’ OLU-prescribing practices.101
Even passing references to such regulation, however, have been forcefully rejected on the ground that we are all better off when physicians
have unfettered liberty to practice medicine.102 Specifically, it is
argued that because medicine remains an inexact or quasiscience—
part art and part science, some say103—it is essential for the protection
of patients’ best interests that the law affords physicians discretion to
make routine judgment calls. Relatedly, the sanctity of the physicianpatient relationship is also said to provide the basis for this discretion,
both on the ground that it is only within that relationship that the
requisite medical and personal information necessary for good decisionmaking is known, and on the ground that respect for patients’
decisional autonomy requires that physicians be able to do what their
101 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (providing additional
background).
102 See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer Treatment:
Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3206, 3206–07 (2006)
(supporting a requirement that “Medicare contractors . . . take into account peerreviewed literature” in order to expand coverage for off-label uses); Asco Supports Government Report: “Off-Label Drugs: Reimbursement Policies Constrain Physicians in Choice of
Cancer Therapies”, 5 ONCOLOGY Oct. 1991, at 29, 29–30, 33.
103 See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 5, at 247.
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patients want them to do. In other words, this argument conceives of
physicians’ liberty as the vehicle that safeguards both patients’ physical well-being and their right to make unfettered decisions in their
own interests.104 Concerns that physicians may abuse their liberty to
the detriment of their patients are countered by assurances that physicians’ training and ethical codes together provide ample protection.
More protection for patients, especially if it were to come from law, is
rejected as an affront to the dignity of the profession and its fealty
especially to those codes.105
Much of this is obviously right. Medicine is not an exact science.
The practice of medicine is in large part defined by the inevitability
and ubiquity of judgment calls, what Kathryn Montgomery calls the
“radical uncertainty” of medicine.106 Any regulation of the practice of
medicine, whether it be by the profession itself, by law, or by some
other societal institution, must recognize these realities. Assuming
that patients’ best interests are the shared objective, this means that
discretion to make intelligent judgment calls must be afforded. It is
essential to protect the physician-patient relationship, again assuming
patients’ best interests are the shared objective. The reasons for this
include, among other things, that patient welfare (medical and otherwise) is usually going to be maximized in circumstances of trust and
commitment, both of which are unlikely to exist if this one-on-one
relationship either does not exist or is breached in relevant respects.
Finally, the medical profession is populated by physicians whose ethical commitment and life’s work is not merely to “do no harm”; it is, if
at all possible, to make their patients well. The medical profession is
arguably unique in these respects. But even if it is not, it is at least
beyond question that respect for these commitments demands meticulous consideration of efforts, perhaps especially by outsiders, to
judge physicians’ judgment calls post hoc and to restrict the range of
possible calls ex ante.
What is incorrect is that physicians need to be unfettered in their
prescribing practices to achieve maximal patient welfare. Indeed,
such a right as applied to problematic OLU, particularly those for
which there is little to no good evidence of safety or efficacy, is antithetical to patient welfare and represents anachronistic medical eth104 See supra notes 40–42 (describing this argument).
105 See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Fundamental Elements of the PatientPhysician Relationship, AM. MED. ASS’N (1990), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/
upload/mm/code-medical-ethics/1001a.pdf; Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs,
The Patient-Physician Relationship, AM. MED. ASS’N (2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama1/pub/upload/mm/code-medical-ethics/10015a.pdf.
106 KATHRYN MONTGOMERY, HOW DOCTORS THINK 53 (2006).
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ics. It is antithetical to patient welfare to prescribe such products
because they may be affirmatively harmful. Even if they are not, they
preclude alternative approaches with a proven track record of effectiveness. Prescribing problematic OLU is anachronistic medical ethics
because modern ethics call for evidence-based medical practice and,
correspondingly, preclude experimentation outside of formalized trials with built-in safeguards to protect patient-subject health and decisional autonomy. By definition, problematic OLU are the opposite of
evidence-based medical practice. And by definition, they are experimental, albeit with more or less of a basis for trusting in the outcome
of the experiment depending on the degree of evidentiary support at
issue. On the latter point, it has been well over fifty years since
Nuremberg, when societies around the world—including the United
States—rejected the notion that experimenting with patients, even
ostensibly in their own interests, was permissible in the absence of
consent for the experiment.107 Where the medical profession itself has
rejected as an insufficient bulwark against the harms that might come
to patients in these circumstances physicians’ sincere intent to “do no
harm”—good faith alone is no longer the medical standard—it
behooves the law to follow suit.
Arguments in favor of a laissez-faire approach to regulating OLU
based on an imagined threat to either the doctor-patient relationship
or the ability of physicians to practice medicine as they see fit ring
hollow and are unjustified. The doctor-patient relationship has withstood such “assaults” before108 and continues to tolerate such regulatory intrusion as state licensing requirements and hospital
credentialing mandates for doctors. The sanctity of the physicianpatient relationship is important, but it ought not to be mistaken for
the ultimate objective, which is respect for physician autonomy in the
best interests of the patient. Where unfettered autonomy risks harming those interests, relevant, carefully tailored restrictions should be
considered. It is this work that we take up in Part III below.
III. WHAT LEGAL REGULATION OF PHYSICIANS’
OLU MIGHT LOOK LIKE
As we noted in the Introduction to this Article, it is generally
agreed both that OLU unjustified by sufficient evidence of safety and
107 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing this point).
108 For instance, the AMA notoriously lodged vociferous objections to the creation
of Medicare, in part arguing that it heralded the death knell of the doctor-patient
relationship and its companion, physician autonomy. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 368 (1982).
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efficacy are problematic, and that effective regulation is necessary.109
In Part II, we argued that legal regulation of physicians’ problematic
OLU is a necessary component of effective regulation. This final Part
imagines what legal regulation of physicians’ OLU might look like.
Our objective is not to prescribe a particular regulatory regime.
Rather, it is to provide a template for what we hope will be a broader
discussion of the specifics. To this end, we first set out the necessary
elements of a sound regulatory scheme and follow with an analysis of
possible institutional approaches.
A. The Necessary Elements of a Sound Regulatory Scheme
Based on the reasons for regulating physicians’ problematic
OLU—protecting patients’ interests in safe and effective medication
and in decisional autonomy, and protecting society from unwarranted
medical costs—a sound regulatory scheme should include at least the
following four elements:
1. Restrictions Corresponding to Evidentiary Support
Restrictions on prescribing behavior should be based on a sliding
scale that corresponds to the evidentiary support for the particular
OLU. Thus, there should be no restrictions on OLU that are not
problematic because they are justified by high-quality evidence. While
these OLU have not gone through the formal FDA approval process,
the evidence in their favor has accumulated over time and in relation
to the relevant subpopulations is deemed to be the functional
equivalent. In contrast, there should be an outright ban on unjustified or merely whimsical OLU. It is difficult to imagine a rational
basis for extending prescribing authority in these circumstances.
Indeed, we assume that unjustified OLU would be characterized as
medical abuse even if they were based in an affirmative request from a
patient to subject himself or herself to an unnecessary experiment.
The majority of OLU in between—OLU justified by some but not
high-quality evidence and OLU justified by the need or desire to innovate—should be relevantly restricted. There is room for debate about
the nature and extent of such restrictions. But they might, for example, include permission to prescribe in these categories, but only in
circumstances where there are no safe and effective alternatives, and
only if the patient is provided with information about the state of the
evidence during the consent process and the use is cataloged and
109 See supra notes 14–17, 33–39 and accompanying text (describing evidentiary
standards and regulations on pharmaceutical marketing).
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reported. Or, the former requirement—no safe and effective alternatives—might be waived for OLU justified by some but not high-quality
evidence, but retained in the case of OLU justified by the need or
desire to innovate.110
2. FDA Status as Medically Material Information in the Informed
Consent Process
Physicians prescribing problematic OLU should be required to
describe the state of the evidence in support of the use to the patient
as part of the informed consent process. We agree in this respect with
prior commentators who have argued on behalf of this requirement.111 Just as their counterparts in formalized trials, patients in the
OLU setting have the right to know that proposed treatment is in
some respects experimental. Specifically, correcting the misimpression most patients likely have that the drugs and biologics they are
prescribed are approved by the FDA for the use to which they will be
put is essential to respecting their bodily integrity and decisional
autonomy.112
We reject the contrary view, most prominently espoused by Beck
and Azari, that providing this information would inevitably be too
complicated or cumbersome for physicians, and would confuse
patients unnecessarily, even to the point that they would act contrary
to their own best interests.113 Their 1998 article on the subject, FDA,
Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions,
has been quite influential, particularly in its central claim that a drug’s
FDA status is not medically material information and thus (according
to standard informed consent doctrine) need not be disclosed to
patients.114 This claim—“it is not possible to draw any conclusion
about the safety or effectiveness of a particular use of a drug . . . from
the administrative/legal status of that use as off-label”115—is disingen110 Importantly, others who have discussed this problem and come to similar conclusions have suggested nonbinding directives for physicians to attempt to control the
most egregious practices of OLU. However, while we are extending this analysis by
calling for new statutory regulation of problematic OLU as a mechanism for managing physicians’ abuses of the current system, the content of these proposed regulations would be similar, if not identical to what others have recommended for
nonbinding practice guidelines. See, e.g., Dresser & Frader, supra note 5, 476–77.
111 See, e.g., Johns, supra note 9, at 1023–24.
112 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (discussing this misimpression).
113 See Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 72.
114 See id.; see also supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text (describing the
related case law).
115 Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 84.
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uous as applied to OLU that are not supported by high-quality evidence of safety and efficacy. That is, OLU in these categories are, by
definition,116 questionable in these precise respects,117 and thus, FDA
status is actually a perfect “proxy” for safety and efficacy.118 This is
particularly true since it appears that most patients mistakenly believe
that FDA approval codes for safety and efficacy; in other words, to
patients, FDA status is medically material information.119
Given these facts, it is paternalistic and antithetical to patients’
decisional autonomy to hold (as Beck and Azari urge) that the FDA
status of a product should, as a policy matter, be considered legally
immaterial in circumstances where it would in fact be material. Long
rejected is the historical view that, without their patients’ knowledge
or agreement, physicians should be able to decide for them what is in
their best interests.120 Also rejected is the notion that physicians are
116 See supra notes 2–5 (explaining that on-label means that the FDA put a drug
through rigorous testing for safety and efficacy and off-label means it did not).
117 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (discussing the different levels of
evidentiary support for OLU).
118 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (setting out Beck and Azari’s argument that FDA status is not a “proxy” for safety and efficacy).
119 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (discussing this point). This is all
so plain that the only way to explain Beck and Azari’s argument to the contrary is that,
rather than being objective scholarly commentators, they are (appropriately) vigorous
advocates for their clients’ (manufacturers’) very particular and different concerns.
To their credit, Beck and Azari disclose this affiliation at note ** of their article. See
Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 71 n.**. Notably, they also acknowledge that safety
and efficacy are medically material information, as is the fact that a prescription
would be for an innovative use. See id. at 72.
120 See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (Minn. 1905) (“Under a free government, at least, the free citizen’s first and greatest right, which underlies all others—
the right to the inviolability of his person; in other words, the right to himself—is the
subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however skillful or eminent, who has been asked to examine, diagnose, advise,
and prescribe . . . to violate, without permission, the bodily integrity of his patient . . .
without his consent or knowledge.” (quoting Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166
(1905))), overruled by Genzel v. Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957); id. at 14–15
(“The patient must be the final arbiter as to whether he will take his chances with [the
proposed treatment], or take his chances of living without it. Such is the natural right
of the individual, which the law recognizes as a legal one.” (quoting 1 EDGAR B.
KINKEAD, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 375 (1901))); Schloendorff v. Soc’y
of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Few would argue that one of the
singularly significant outcomes of the Nuremberg Trials and the subsequent Belmont
Report was to emphasize the exceptional, if not unique, importance of informed consent to the practice of medicine and clinical research. See THE BELMONT REPORT,
supra note 38. In their influential history of informed consent, Faden and
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justified in acting unilaterally to save competent patients from their own
bad decisions. Commitment to patients’ individual right of decisional
autonomy means that patients decide, not their doctors, what their
best interests require. Even if that decision is an unwise one from a
medical or objective perspective, it is to be honored.121 In these circumstances, it ought to be the case as a matter of law that a physician
may not withhold from a patient the fact that they are being prescribed a product that is supported by less than high-quality evidence
of safety or efficacy; in other words, that their treatment is, in essence,
an experiment in these respects. Courts that have held otherwise—
for example, courts that have concluded that because prescribing
OLU in general is legal, individual OLU are fine—likely do not know
that OLU vary in terms of their evidentiary support.122 If they do
Beauchamp note the historical transition of doctors’ behavior and attitude in requesting permission to do something to (and for) patients:
Until recently . . . the justification of practices of disclosure and consentseeking were strictly governed by what we shall call a beneficence model rather
than an autonomy model of the physician’s responsibility for the patient. The
“autonomy model,” as we use the term, is the view that the physician’s
responsibilities of disclosure and consent-seeking are established primarily
(perhaps exclusively) by the principle of respect for autonomy. The “beneficence model,” as we use the term, depicts the physician’s responsibilities of
disclosure and consent-seeking as established by the principle of beneficence, in particular through the idea that the physician’s primary obligation
(surpassing obligations of respect for autonomy) is to provide medical benefits. The management of information is understood, on the latter model, in
terms of the managements of patients (“due care”) generally. That is, the
physician’s primary obligation is to handle information so as to maximize
the patient’s medical benefits. Here, the principle of beneficence is used to
provide clinical-specific meanings for the benefits and harms to be balanced
by the physician.
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
59 (1986) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). As these authors point out, the
progression to the autonomy-based model leaves behind a more paternalistic template for physician-patient interactions in which the pendulum of decisionmaking
power still heavily favored the doctor, whose role was to look out for what was best for
the patient. The latter, more recent development, allowed for a more equalized form
of power sharing; indeed, it placed the responsibility for making decisions about what
was in the best interests of the patient in the correct location: with the patient herself.
This is the ideal, which is what we aim for both in regulation (or legislation) and
practice, certainly when it comes to informed consent for research. But, we also see a
similar practice in clinical medicine, especially in the rules governing consent for procedures, surgery and the like.
121 See DOBBS, supra note 62, at 652–53. Only in cases where the patient is incompetent can proxy decisionmaking by physicians and others take place.
122 See supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text (discussing this case law).
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know this, it is impossible not to conclude that they act inconsistently
with modern informed consent doctrine.123
Finally, we reject as specious the argument, made by Beck and
Azari, among others, that requiring physicians to disclose a product’s
FDA status is too onerous.124 As a threshold matter, physicians ought
never be permitted to prescribe a product without knowing the evidentiary basis for its use, and in particular whether it is safe and effective. Knowing its FDA status is an aspect of that inquiry, and in the
modern context, neither this fact nor additional facts about the evidentiary basis for a product are difficult to find.125 To the consent
process itself, physicians acting in purely clinical settings are already
required to obtain consent from patients in circumstances where the
medical facts are difficult for laypersons to comprehend. Summarizing the state of the evidence supporting an OLU, for example in the
way we have done in this Article, is not more complicated and would
likely suffice in the vast majority of cases. (Here, for example, we
imagine a physician telling a patient that she is recommending drug
X, that drug X has passed the FDA’s safety and efficacy testing for a
different use, not for this use, but that there is good, although not
conclusive, evidence that it may be safe and/or effective for the proposed use.) Some particularly cautious or curious patients will ask for
additional details. But this is also not different from current
exchanges. In any case, respect for the objectives of the consent process requires compliance.
3. Consideration of Sanctions for Violations
The third component of a sound regulatory scheme should be
the establishment of sanctions for violations, to incentivize physician
compliance with restrictions on their OLU. Many, if not most, physicians may agree with the substance of the restrictions and thus comply
in the absence of sanctions. However, because the restrictions would
reverse over a century of laissez-faire policies and professional culture
123 See DOBBS , supra note 62, at 652–53; supra notes 112–13 and accompanying
text (setting out this doctrine).
124 See Beck & Azari, supra note 11, at 72.
125 Even before the advent of the Internet and the wide accessibility to electronic
databases for easily available sources of information about FDA-approved uses and
indications for drugs—for example, see About DailyMed, DAILYMED, http://dailymed.
nlm.nih.gov/about.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011), a website maintained by the
National Institutes of Health—physicians were able manually to look things up in the
ubiquitous PDR, available in hospitals, libraries, and most doctors’ offices (often a
“gift” from drug detail men). Today, one can quickly research the quality of data for
a particular drug using any one of a number of different sources.
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with respect to prescribing behavior, in the absence of relevant sanctions, the regulations are likely to be ignored or even rejected by
some.
There is room for debate again here about the minimum penalties that would be effective to force compliance among those in this
latter group. But they might include monetary penalties for first or
mild offenses—for example, a one-time prescription for an OLU justified by some but not high-quality evidence where the conditions for
such use were not fulfilled. And they might include license suspensions or revocations for multiple or severe violations—for example, a
persistent refusal to comply with the regulatory regime or the prescription of a knowingly unjustified OLU. Establishing the restrictions
as an aspect of the standard of care would also serve an incentivizing
function, as violations involving more than merely dignitary losses
could provide the basis for successful malpractice claims.
A complementary or alternative approach would involve
expanding the system, currently in widespread use, that authorizes
payment for a particular service only when that service is supported by
a valid clinical indication. In other words, rather than penalizing physicians directly, by imposing fines for regulatory violations, physicians
might be penalized indirectly, by nonpayment for restricted services.
For instance, many insurance companies (including Medicare and
Medicaid) must approve the order for certain expensive tests (such as
MRI scans), and that approval is often dependent on the rationale
listed by the ordering physician. For drugs, many third-party payers
maintain formulary lists of medications that are and are not covered.
However, this is rarely inclusive of clinical indication, leaving enormous discretion to physicians’ prescribing habits. It would not be too
onerous to expand this type of scrutiny to include a clinical indication; if supported by reasonable or high-quality evidence, an OLU
would be covered. If not, then the patient would have to pay out of
pocket.126
4. A Reporting Requirement and Safety and Efficacy Database
The fourth and final component of a sound regulatory scheme
should be provision for a reporting requirement and a (nationally)
centralized database of OLU. As things stand today, millions of
unregulated miniexperiments take place annually, without any mech126 An even more exacting form of regulation would be to restrict the dispensing
of drugs to those for which a valid indication exists, even for those patients who are
willing and able to pay for them. However, such a move might require amending the
FDA’s OLU regulations accordingly.
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anism for compiling and sharing the data that result. That is, unless
physicians share their OLU experiences publicly by giving talks or
writing papers, or patients who are harmed by OLUs themselves publicize their plight, information about safety and efficacy largely travels
through the medical community via anecdote.127 The goal of the
reporting requirement and database would be the establishment over
time of publicly accessible information about the safety and efficacy of
particular OLU so that physicians and patients can in the future proceed with the maximum information possible. If OLU unsupported
by high-quality evidence of safety and effectiveness are to be permitted, with or without restrictions otherwise, it is simply good public
health policy to compile and make widely available the data on uses
and outcomes so that, over time, the case for or against them solidifies. There are different ways this reporting requirement and
database could be established and funded, including as a matter of
federal law and through contributions from manufacturers interested
in having their products used off-label.
B. Possible Institutional Approaches
A critical aspect of the development of any regulatory scheme is
establishing the institution or institutions that would be involved in
administering restrictions and sanctions. Again in this context there
are multiple possibilities. We set out several below, understanding
that some are likely to be more attractive than others depending on
the nature of the restrictions that are ultimately established, and given
the associated costs and professional politics at issue in this context.
Notwithstanding the traditional refrain that the federal government does not regulate the practice of medicine,128 its related agencies could play a role. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act would
likely have to be amended by Congress to provide the FDA with the
127 This can be published or unpublished. Indeed, some authors have even
lauded the importance of anecdotal “evidence” and lamented its decreasing significance. See Jeffrey K. Aronson, Editorial, Anecdotes as Evidence, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1346,
1346 (2003); Jeffrey K. Aronson & Manfred Hauben, Anecdotes that Provide Definitive
Evidence, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1267, 1268–69 (2006); John F. Butterworth, Editorial, Case
Reports: Unstylish but Still Useful Sources of Clinical Information, 34 REGIONAL ANESTHESIA
& PAIN MED. 187, 187–88 (2009); Anne-Michelle Ruha, Editorial, The Case Report: A
Tool for the Toxicologist, 5 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 1, 1–2 (2009); Bill Winett, Letter to the
Editor, There Is Value in Anecdotal Reports of Relief from Migraine with Botulinum Toxin, 15
J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 78, 78 (2009).
128 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining the basis for this refrain);
infra note 132 and accompanying text (noting the limited contexts in which the federal government has affirmatively regulated medical practice).
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requisite jurisdiction—as it stands, it is generally held that this agency
only has authority to regulate manufacturers129—a process that might
ultimately yield the most conceptually satisfying result, but which
could be quite difficult as a practical matter.130 But Heath and
Human Services (HHS) jurisdiction likely could be established in the
absence of congressional action.
For example, perhaps most easily, HHS’s Medicare protocols
could be amended to provide for unrestricted payments to physicians
(and coverage for patients) for OLU supported by high-quality evidence of safety and efficacy, but then restricted to no payments for
OLU with less evidentiary support. This would mirror the approach
currently in place for federal funding of pharmaceuticals and procedures generally.131 Further, the federal approach to existing
restricted pharmaceutical products—such as narcotics—could be
adopted in this area, although perhaps best under the jurisdiction of
an entity other than the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). This
would provide a form of federal ban on physicians’ problematic OLU,
coupled with an exception for physicians who could show that the requisite conditions had been met.132 Federal requirements concerning
the informed consent process and for the establishment and maintenance of a national OLU database could be included within either of
these approaches. Finally, a requirement that pharmaceutical companies collaborate to fund a national OLU database could be regulated
by the FDA, which already has jurisdiction to address the companies’
treatment of OLU.133
The states might also assume relevant jurisdiction. Indeed,
approaches that provide for an important role for the states would be
129 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (summarizing the FDA’s jurisdiction). But see Kessler, supra note 7, at 698 (arguing otherwise).
130 See Christopher, supra note 5, at 247.
131 See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer Treatment:
Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3206, 3206–07 (2006);
Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 391–403
(2009); Darren A. DeWalt et al., Significance of Medicare and Medicaid Programs for the
Practice of Medicine, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 79, 79–90 (2005); Su-Ying Liang
et al., Letter to the Editor, Medicare Formulary Coverage for Top-Selling Biologics, 27
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1082, 1082–84 (2009).
132 Physicians’ prescribing practices are already federally regulated when the
drugs at issue fall within the Drug Enforcement Agency’s jurisdiction. See Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2006). Registration is required for a physician
to prescribe controlled substances, and that registration is contingent on following
DEA regulatory provisions. See id. § 823(f).
133 See supra notes 6, 34–36, 43–45 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA’s
related jurisdiction).
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most consistent with the longstanding political position that the practice of medicine is the proper business of the states, and thus they
might elicit less knee-jerk opposition. The key players in this context
would be the legislature, the medical licensing boards, and the courts.
State legislatures could act, either pursuant to federal mandate or
on their own, to codify informed consent and reporting (to the
database) requirements. Restrictions on OLU prescribing practices
according to the sliding scale of evidentiary justification could be similarly imposed. These requirements could be established and administered by the states and their departments of health and human
services, or they could be codified as part of the states’ medical licensing acts. Among other things, these acts set out the legal obligations
and authority of local medical licensing boards.134 To the extent that
statutory deference to the boards would be preferred, for example
because this approach would effect a more minor revolution and thus
be less objectionable politically, it would be essential to enhance the
boards’ jurisdiction and authority, and especially to require their vigorous pursuit of violators.135
State courts acting in malpractice cases could play a role, not only
in applying any statutory reforms that emerge from these proposals,
but in the first instance in better applying existing law. Although
there are only a few reported cases in this area, they generally reflect a
lack of understanding of the facts of OLU, and in particular of their
widely varying evidentiary justifications. Relatedly, some also reflect
an anachronistic tendency both to defer to physicians’ judgment
regardless of its evidentiary basis, and to patronize patients as they
interpret the mandates of informed consent law.136
Finally, insurance companies could be useful institutional partners in any regulatory scheme. Insurance companies operate in much
the same way as Medicare to effect indirect but powerful limits on
physicians’ medical practice and choices. That is, if neither Medicare
nor an insurance company will pay a physician for services associated
with problematic OLU-prescribing practices, or pay for the drug
involved, it is likely that such practices will cease or at least be substantially limited. The role that insurers and Medicare already play in limiting treatment options is controversial, as it is seen by many as an
134 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-5.1 (2009) (empowering and requiring the board
to, for example, “[d]evelop and implement methods to identify . . . physicians who
fail to meet acceptable standards of care” and to “[d]evelop and implement methods
to ensure the ongoing competence of” licensed physicians).
135 See supra Part I.B.1, .3 (discussing the current role and limitations of the states’
medical licensing boards).
136 See supra Part I.B.2 (describing this case law).
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inappropriate invasion of the physician-patient relationship and
restriction on patients’ (at least moral) rights to the best treatment
available.137 We generally agree that this critique is legitimate. However, to the extent that insurance companies’ role can be managed so
that it is limited to restricting or prohibiting only bad—as in potentially unsafe and/or ineffective, rather than merely expensive—medications, it ought to be considered.
CONCLUSION
There are a few relationships that society treats as sacrosanct.
These relationships are embedded within a zone of privacy that is considered (at least in theory) to be impenetrable. The physician-patient
relationship is one of these, along with, inter alia, the parent-child
relationship and the spousal relationship. The physician-patient relationship and others like it are justified as categorically different from
others not so sacrosanct on the grounds that their exchanges are qualitatively more significant than those that occur in other contexts and
that interference from outsiders is more likely to be harmful than
helpful to the interests they are designed to protect. The law largely
reflects these political and social norms. The parent-child, spousal,
and physician-patient relationships, for example, are largely insulated
(again, at least formally) by constitutional provisions, statutes, and
case law, from state and sometimes even private actions that would
affect their conduct.
Notwithstanding this exceptional social status, relationships in
this category, including the physician-patient relationship, are not and
should not be absolutely inviolate. Where the government has an
important enough interest in intervention, breaching the zone of privacy is appropriate and thus ought to be permissible. For example,
where parents, who are otherwise presumed to act in their children’s
best interests, risk them serious physical injury, the law authorizes
state intervention in the relationship. Similarly, where physicians’
prescribing practices, also ordinarily presumed to be in their patients’
best interests, risk them unnecessary harm, the law ought to authorize
intervention and appropriate restrictions. In both contexts, although
deference to the primary decisionmaker remains strong, the reasons
137 See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology, supra note 131, at 3206–07; Joëlle Y.
Friedman et al., The Medicare Modernization Act and Reimbursement for Outpatient Chemotherapy, 110 CANCER 2304, 2310–12 (2007) (noting concern of commentators that
Medicare patients’ access to care would suffer as a result of the Medicare Modernization Act, but finding no empirical support that the Act negatively affected patients);
Tillman et al., supra note 96, at 348–50.
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for the special zone of privacy no longer support its absolute
protection.
In this Article, we argue for the first time that the state ought to
intervene in the otherwise sacrosanct physician-patient relationship
when physicians prescribe medicine off-label that is not justified by
high-quality evidence of safety and efficacy. It is a circumstance that
warrants outsider protection of the vulnerable party to the relationship—the patient—because it involves more risk than is appropriate
according to contemporary ethical standards of evidence-based
medicine and because prescriptions in this category are essentially
equivalent to an unregulated experiment. As it is given in other sacrosanct relationships, due deference should continue to be given to physicians as restrictions are developed to regulate this prescribing
practice. For example, some prescriptions in this category will be
appropriate and thus ought to be permitted even if they are justified
only by some, although not high-quality, evidence of safety and efficacy. The deference cannot be so broad, however, as to include the
right that exists today to proceed unfettered with entirely or insufficiently unjustified prescriptions in the absence of fully informed
consent.
This is no small matter: Off-label uses of drugs are commonplace,
accounting for approximately twenty percent of all prescriptions written in the United States, and a majority of those written by specialists
in pediatrics and oncology. An important number of these lack basic
evidentiary support.138 Perhaps most striking is that the majority of
patients and many of their physicians appear not to know that the
drugs they are using have not been relevantly tested for safety and
efficacy.139
These facts should be sufficient on their own to support regulations that would ensure both that physicians and patients know the
evidentiary basis for the drugs they use and that the use of drugs with
little to no evidentiary basis is appropriately restricted. The failure of
alternative regulatory approaches—primarily regulation of pharmaceutical companies’ off-label promotions practices—to address the
problem of unsubstantiated off-label drug use provides an additional
important rationale. Legal regulation of problem prescribing is likely
to be much more successful because it goes directly to the exchange
that matters most and because physicians’ incentives could be altered
to ensure compliance with relevant restrictions.

138
139

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
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